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·.Abstrak 
.; . . ' . . .. 
Mqjelis Ulama Indonesia (lvJUI) mengeluarkan jatwa No. 2 tahun 2003. 
ya~g berjudul Penyerangim Amerika Serikat dan Sekutunya terhadap Ir~k. ·. 
· Fatwa tersebut dikeluarkan metryusul terjaditrya invasi Amerika Serikat ke Irak 
dan atas dasar beberapa alasan, temtama setelah terjaditrya batryak demonstrasi di 
belahan bumi Indonesia · · 
Fatwa itu temtama berisi tentang sikap MUI terhadap invasiAmerika 
Serikat iersebut. Dalam artikel ini, penulis me'!}elaskan tiga lema utama. Yang 
perlama adalah p'e'!}elasan ten tang eksistensi fa twa terse but, termasuk Ia tar belakang 
. dikeluarkantrya Jatwa itu. Yang kedua, penulis bemsaha untuk menganalisis iupon 
ilmuwan dan ulama Indonesia tentang invasi terse but. Yang terakhir, penulis juga · 
membandingkan Jatwa MUI terse but dengan fatwafatwa 'laintrya dari berbagai 
belahan dunia. . . 
· Abstract 
' . . · The, Coundl of Indonesian Ulama (the MUI) issued a Jatwa number. 2 year 
of 2003 .entitl~d Petryerangan Ainerika Serikat dan Sekutu'nya terhadap Irak (the 
· U.S .. and its .allies· aggression to Iraq). The Jatwa was issued following the. U.S. 
invasion to Iraq and because of several reasons, main!J after numerous demonstrations 
in severalar/as of Indonesia.· · 
· · The Jatwa is main!J about the MUI's attitude concerning the invasionofth~ 
U.S. to Iraq. This paper will demibe three main themes;first!J, the study will define 
· . the. e;ast~m·e of the Jatwa, induding the bad:.grounds of the issti~mce of the jatwa. 
Second!J, it will ~!tempt to examine the responses of Indonesian .scholars and ulama' 
ton:ard the invasion . . Third!J, it will compare other Jatwas from other countii~s, 
'inclu~hig,similar and difftrentjatwas. . ' ' 
•' . 
· Kata Kunci: Fptwa, MUI, ulama, ilmuwan Indonesia, Invasi Amerika Serikat 
ke Irak 
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Intro4~(:tion , ·. . . . . , . . · , . . . : :, : : 
:. On 16 April2003, the Council of Indonesian qama (the,MUI) 
iss~~d a fa twa number 2 year of 2003 en'titled Penyerangatl Amerika,Serikat 
dan S ekutunya terhadap Irak (the U.S; and its allies' aggression· to Iiaq). 
The fatwa was issued following requests iri numerous demonstrations 
against the U.S. invasion to Iraq from Indonesian Muslims in almost all 
over the country and after paying attention to the taush!Jah (Ar. tawsfya)1 
of Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah. of the MUI (the advice of Ukhuwah 
Islamiyah FOrum) on 20 March 2003; the outlook of the Fatwa 
Commission Meeting of the MUI; and the letter of the MUI branch of 
WestJava.2 
The fatwa is mainly about the MUI's attitude concerning the 
invasion of the U.S. to Iraq. The fa twa is. significant not only because the 
invasion. is an international issue, but also' to show the position of the 
MUI among Islamic organizations in Indonesia and the Muslim world as 
well. · . · . 
This paper will descnbethree ~ain themes; ftrstfy, the study will 
· define the existence of the fatwa, including . the backgrounds of the 
issuance of the fatwa: Secondfy, it will attempt to examine the responses of 
Indonesian, scholars and ulama toward the invasion. · Thirdfy, it will 
coi:npare other fatwas from other countries,' including siriiilar and 
different fatwas. . . · 
Background 
1. TheMUI 
The MUI is a national government organization founded on 26 
July 1975 as an initiative of President Suharto to function as a sort of 
boundary between the government and the Muslim community .. The 
function of the MUI is limited to. the issuance of fa twas and non-legal 
recomrriend~tions known as· tausiyahs because it is not permitted to 
commence practical progr-am-s. The first person to propo~e such 
restrictions was Suh.arto himself. At the First National Conference of 
the ulama on 21 July 1975, prior to the establishment of the MUI, 
Suharto ·suggested that the MlJI was supposed not. to be engaged in such 
practical programs as running madrasas (Islamic boarding schools), 
m;sques, or hospitals, for-such activities 'were' reserved for the existing 
-Islamic social organizations, nor in practical politics,· for this was 
. reserV-ed for the existing political p~rties. Jhroughout its existence, the 
activities of the MUI have been designed to insure its acceptance in 
society arid to ·maintain good relations with both the government and 
other Muslim organizations.3 . · 
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In the statutes of the MUI, one finds that it is expected to '· 
function in providing fatwas and tausiyahs both to the government and .. 
common Muslims on issues related to religion in particular and pro~~ems . 
facing the nation in general. The MUI is also expected to encourage ... 
unitf among Muslims, to play the role of mediator between. the 
government and the ulama, and to represent Muslims in interreligious 
group deliberations.4 In general, during the New Order Eia of Suharto' s 
presidency, the MUI's position vis-a-vis the government was· uneasy, as 
· reflected in its fatwas and tausiyahs.5 However, as can be seen in its·2000 
vision statement, the·MUI plays five major roles. They are: (1) the heir to 
the, Prophet in spreading Islamic teachings and striving . for the 
· construction of an Islamic life; (2) a fatwa-giver for the Muslim 
· cornrriunity, whether 1;equested or not;6 (3) a guide and .servant to the 
. comniunity; (4) an agent for "reform and renewal; and (5) an upholder of · 
the Qui: 'anic dictate to enjoin good and avert evil.7 
Therefore, the collapse of the New Order Era on 21 May 1998, 
replaced by the Reformation Era (or known as "Era Reformasi'), signalled 
major changes and opened up a space for public opinion.8 The new era 
· gave the MUI a chance to redefine its roles for the future. The MUI then 
became more active in politics and Umma-oriented in its activities. Its 
political role is reflected in its tausiyahs. This is mainly because the MUI 
has been forced to react to political situations.9 One of the well-known 
examples of tausiyahs is· amana! (instruction) and was issued on the 
tausiyah section of Mimbar Ulama (the official mouthpiece of the 1fUI) in 
the days prior to.the Pemi/ihan Umum (General Election) 1999 to instruct 
Muslims mainly to vote properly with sincerity and to be aware of the 
revival of the danger of communism, authoritarian, ·and secular powers 
by means of the political parties which participate in Pemilihan · Umtfm; 
The · MUI quoted Surah Al Imran verse 28, which is, '~Let not the 
Believers take the Unbelievers as their leaders". Political analysts thought 
·. this instruction was directed against The Indonesian Democratic Party 
for the Struggle (PDI-P) for its several non-Muslim leaders.10 
2. Th'e 2003 U.S. Invasion and the Situations around the World 
The 2003 Iraq war .was one of the most controversial· wars 
fought by the U.S. after World War II. When Al-Qaeda attacked the 
· World Trade Centre and Pentagon in 2001, it altered the perception of 
threats to the U.S., especially in the minds of policymakers. In _the first· 
half of 2002, the Bush administration began to develop its· case. by 
placing Iraq at the very heart of the war on terrorism. They remained 
convinced that Iraq was a dangerous and impending threat. This led 
. George Bush administration to release the National Security Strategy 
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(NSS) ·in September 2002. Following that address· Bush assembled a 
. coali~op; to confront President Saddam Hussein and demanded,Ir~q 
prove a. difficult negative in terms of .weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD).11 Bush had been stressing the weapons issue for months prior. 
to the invasion. On 15 February 200\ over eight million people 
demonstrated on five continents against a war that had not yet begun. 
This global mobilization sought to head off the occupation of Iraq being 
plotted in the Pentagon. On 21 March 2003, the U.S. and British forces 
began across the Iraqi border ;nd conducted war to confront the regiine 
of. Saddam Hussein over· its WMD developmental program and 
sponsorship of terrorist organizations,12 However; no WMD have been 
found. Hans Blix, the Chief of the UN Arms Inspector, complained that 
the. U:S. to justify its going to war had used him, and he advised other 
countries. never to accept a UN team again.13 On 9 April 2003 Saddam 
Hussein and Ba' ath totalitarian regime feU apart. The vast majority of 
Iraqis did not want to defend Ba'ath regime due to the nature of the 
patrimonial totalitarian regime Saddam Hussein created in his own 
image. The war officially ended on 1· May 2003 but the U.S. forces are 
still there up to the present day. After the _war, many pundits expressed 
surprise that no nuclear weapons program was found in Iraq. 14 . 
Countries around the world .. reacted differently to~ard the · 
invasion. · On the one hand, Italy and . Spain, as well as Portugal, 
Denmark, . Greece and East European· countries, such as Poland, 
Hungary, , arid 'Albania were among countries that supported the 
invasion. Ori the other hand;: France and Germany protested for months 
by claiming opposition to the invasion. They coaxed Moscow into 
expressinRits disagreement \Vith the U;S: plans. In East Asia, Japan and 
South Korea were the· main espousers of the invasion; while in the 
Middle East some countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan 
provided facilities for the U.S .. forces .. Surprisingly, the Arab League 
surpassed itself as a collective expression of ignominy, announcing its 
opposition to the invasion .·even as a .majority of members were 
participating in it.15 · ·· · · · . 
:In Saudi Arabia the officials from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs 
began to struggle to hold preachers to an apolitical line, declaring that 
Frida'y sermons are supposed to; unite the: natiori instead of dividing 
people. Even if the Saudi leaders were aware that they could not 
camouflage all the U.S. war preparations reportedly proceeding in their 
country, they seemed to be pressing· hard t6 keep away any open 
expressions of dissent that might-galvanize a new internal opposition. 
Nevertheless,· opposition appeared to be widespread and intensely felt. 
In . the week before the invasion, a group of 200 . Saudis intellectuals 
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published a petition both condemning the invasion and demanding a 
measure of democracy at home.16 
It is interesting to note that even in Australia and the U.K., 
where the opposition party or significant numbers of the governmental 
party opposed the invasion, the legality of the invasion was contested. 
Indeed, in some debates to get the legitimacy to participate in the 
invasion, both governments took the unusual step of releasing internal 
legal memoranda outlining reasons by which the invasion could be 
considered legal. 17 
The situations in Southeast Asia became more sombre during the 
first days of the invasion. The governments of Indonesia and Malaysia, 
like the governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Bunna, opposed this act as 
aggre!ision, while the governments of Singapore, the Philippines, and 
Thailand supported the illegal war. Meanwhile, Brunei and Cambodia did 
not take public positions on the issue. 18 Malaysia demanded the 
resignation of Kofi Annan as Secretary General for his silence toward 
the U.S. invasion, while in Indonesia, President Megawati drew attention 
by calling for an emergency meeting of the Security Council to condemn 
the invasion. 19 
Nonetheless, it was at the level of the citizenry that opposition to 
the invasion was more vocal and organized. Muslims, not only in 
Indonesia and Malaysia but also in countries such as the Philippines and 
Thailand, where they are a minority, protested. The Muslims in 
Southeast Asia had an added reason to oppose the invasion and 
subsequent occupation of Iraq. This is why in ma,ny of the 
demonstrations and public rallies held in Indonesian and Malaysian cities 
prior to the invasion, the tragedy of the subjugation and oppression of 
the Palestinian people was often emblazoned across banners and 
buntings. It is partly because of the injustice done to the Palestinians that 
the invasion of Iraq has inflamed Muslim passions throughout the 
world.20 
This anger and outrage explains the emergence of fringe groups 
in Indonesia, in particular those that have chosen to resort to violence 
and terror in order to achieve their political agenda. Of course, the 
situation in Indonesia itself has also been a contributing factor. 
Howh er, it is important to emphasize that the overwhelming majority 
of Indonesians has vehemently rejected political violence in all forms . 
This is borne out by the fact that in every election since 1998, political 
parties that have adopted an uncompromising stand against violence and 
terror have been the biggest winners. Besides, Muslim mass movements 
in Indonesia with millions and millions of members, such as the 
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. NahdatU.l.· · Ulama and the Muhammadiyah~ have- openly· denounced 
. terro'ris,t groups and their leaders.21 - -:_ 
The! Responses of Indonesian Scholars . and Ulama toward the 
Invasion 
_ In Indonesia, various respc;mses rose concerning the invasion. 
Before the U.S. and British forces began to invade I~aq, Indon~sia and 
· Egypt had already committed their concerns about the possibility"of the 
U.S. invasion. Based on theil: foreign policies, both Indonesia and Egypt 
refused the,intervention of-foreign power in a sovereign country and 
asked the United Nations to solve the crisis in the MiddleEast.22-
. Meanwhile, . thousand Muslims from· Jakarta and-· its . environs -
gathered in the:Mosque Istiqlal to hear tausiyahs from·a p-rominent a!im 
· K.H. Abdullah Gymnastiar on 9 March 2003 and refused the· possibility 
of the. U.S. invasion all at once. The peace action was called "Bersama 
_ untuk Bangsd' (Together for Nation).23 Other actions were held in several 
c!i:ies: The goals were connected with each other:- to refuse the war. 
h,ecause of humanity and solidarity' of Muslims aU over the worlel. 
Moreover, Australia considered · Indonesia as an iinportant 
element in anticipating the possibility of war in Iraq regarding Indonesia 
as the largest Muslim country in the world. Australia's Prime 1\iinister · 
John Howard tried to convince Indonesia that the· hostility isaimed at 
the Iraqi regime, not at the Iraqi people or Islam. Thus, he tried to · 
obtain Indonesia's _.permission by visiting Jakarta after his . trips to 
Washington and London as a symbol of how important Indonesia's 
. . . h I . . . 24 pos1t1on 1n t e raq cns1s. -- - . - . - :. · 
· Right after the invasion, in a press conference after a plenary· 
session on 20 March· 2003; the Indonesian government criticized and 
deplored the act·of the U.S. and its allies that unilaterally attacked Iraq. 
-The session also produced seve'n policies concerning the inva_siori. One-
of the~ was to criticize the invasion: Indonesia thought that the abuse of -
military power in Iraq based on· a. unilateral· decision· wa~ ·considered as 
an actof aggression that is incompatible with the intemationallaws.25 ' 
- -However; a :month before the invasion, George ·Bush called ' 
President Megawad Soek:unoputri explaining the u~s. plan to attack· 
Iraq;·yet there was nopressure from the-U.S. to Indonesia to support the 
. plan since Bush had already known where Indonesia stood in the issue.26 
_ The invasion received many responses in Indonesia. All of them 
-refused the war in the name of humanity. One dayafter the Aineric:iris 
invaded Iraq; demonstrations against the war were<held in· several ,big 
_cities in Indonesia. The masses tnairily gathered in the U.S~ embassy in' 
Ja~arta. On the second day, it seemedthat_the c::m~assy wa,sa:favotirite · 
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place to voice their anger against the war. Although they came from 
different groups, their demand was the same: ask the U.S. to stop the 
war. They also demanded the U.N. to prosecute George Bush, Tony 
Blair, John Howard, and Jose Maria Aznar of Spain in the International 
Court of Justice as war criminals. They thought that the war was not 
more than the U.S. and its allies' ambition to take over the power of Iraq 
oil. Furthermore, they also demanded the Indonesian government to end 
the diplomatic ties of Indonesia and the U.S. which they thought as a 
terrorist country. In addition, they blamed the U.N. for their silence 
attitude towards the issue. Even tho~gh the action was considered as a 
peaceful demonstration, there was an American flag-burning incident. 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Partai Amanat Nasional (the National Mandate 
Party), and Masyarakat Anti Perang (the Anti War Society) were among 
the demonstrators who stood against the war.27 
Saiful Mujani,28 an Indonesian scholar said that it was the 
Washington rhetoric which claimed the war as the Iraqis liberation from 
Saddam 's tyranny. After the regime fell, the U.S. would build democracy 
there. The democracy would be built with war and occupation. Some 
people justified this thought. The Germany and Japan cases in World 
. War II were considered as a justification. The U.S. and its allies fought 
Germany and Japan and then helped the countries to rebuild democracy 
politics after they were defeated in the war. However, the cases were not 
equal with the Iraq case. The U.S. justified its declaration of war against 
Germany and Japan due to the threats caused by their expansions to 
Europe, and East and Southeast Asia. No one could deny the threats and 
thus, the war became the final resort to solve the problem. Meanwhile, 
the war in Iraq was a war of choice, not because of a certainty. It means 
that the Iraqi war could have been avoided if President George Bush 
would like to avoid it. He and his administration could have chosen a 
peaceful way to disarm the Iraqi's 'weapon and there were still ways to 
build democracy peacefully.29 
Meanwhile, another Indonesian scholar, Hamid Basyaib30 stated 
that people easily considered the conflict in Iraq as a war. The fact 
showed us that it was not a war at all; not because the arms of the two 
sides were not equally strong, but rather than the reasons of the invasion 
were ' contrary to the international laws agreed upon by the world for a 
half century. Therefore, the right term was "invasion", and in the context 
of the victims, it would be more proper to call it a "massacre".31 
As the sympathy, solidarity and effort to relieve the Iraqi's 
suffering, the Indonesian government decided to send humanity aid to 
Iraq. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Hassan Wirajuda stated the 
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government decree to the press on 27 March 2003. He said that the aid 
would be in the form of medicines and food. 32 
Furthermore, hundred thousand people from various elements 
with the slogan "Aksi Sejuta Massa (the Million People Action)" with the 
main purpose to oppose the U.S. invasion to Iraq gathered in the main 
streets in Jakarta. The sympathizers from Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (the 
Welfare Justice Party) dominated the masses in Komite Indonesia untuk 
Solidaritas Rakyat Irak (the Indonesian Committee for the Iraqis 
Solidarity) . They gathered since 07 .00 on Sunday morning and headed to 
the U.S. embas·sy. Other elements joined the action came from Partai 
Amanat Nasional (the National Mandate Party), PPP Reformasi, 
Persatuan Umat Katolik Indonesia (the United Indonesian Catholic), 
Persatuan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (the United Muhammadiyah 
Students), and Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah (the Association of 
Muhammadiyah Youths). Among the masses were political and public 
figures, such as Muslim scholars Amien Rais, Nurcholis Madjid, Hidayat 
Nur Wahid, a women activist Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, and a 
member of Komnas HAM (the National Commission for Human 
Rights) Bambang W. Suharto. The prominent figures declared anti-war 
oration to persuade the U.S. government to end the invasion and 
appealed the International Court of Justice to bring to justice by 
declaring George Bush and Tony Blair as war criminals. They also 
demanded the invasion to end as soon as possible.33 
The chairperson of Muhammadiyah, one of the biggest Muslim 
organizations in Indonesia, Din Syamsudin said that the representatives 
of three million people demonstrating in "Aksi So/uta Umal' refused to 
meet the U.S. ambassador in Jakarta. The main reason was clear. Their 
demand was to stop the war now. The statement "Stop the War Now" 
was stated repeatedly. Prior to Syamsudin was the chairperson of the 
MUI Amidhan, who also gave a speech concerning the issue.34 
The National Committee for Human Rights (Komnas HAM) 
persuaded the U.N. to take action to stop the invasion. In its press 
conference on 31 March 2003 the committee said that the invasion was a 
serious offence against human rights, especially the rights of the Iraqis to 
live reacefully. The committee condemned the military aggression as 
well. The statement had been sent to the General Secretary of the U.N., 
the Security Council of the U.N., the General Assembly of the U.N., 
UNESCO, and ICRC. Meanwhile, the National Assembly of KAHMI 
(the Corps of Muslim Student Association Alumni) persuaded the 
General Secretary of the U.N. to commend an emergency session to ask 
the responsibility of George Bush towards his unilateral action violating 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the U.N. Charter.35 
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The former of Indonesian president Abdurrahman Wahid said 
that Indonesia had to participate actively as a mediator in the conflict, 
because, according to him, if the invasion took more than three months, 
it meant that the crisis could not be solved (through war), but through 
the court. Thus, Indonesia had to stand in between to become a 
mediator.36 
In Yogyakarta, the Nahdlatul Ulama branch of Yogyakarta 
appealed all Muslims to perform a funeral prayer for Muslims who died 
in Iraq because of the invasion. They considered the invasion as 
"impertinence" and "despotism". They considered it as an "accursed 
international terrorism" and endangered peace on earth. Moreover, the 
"despotism" done by the U.S. not only hurt the Muslim world, but also 
spread danger to the world society. As a kind of solidarity, they would 
collect aid to help the Iraqis.37 
Nurcholis Madjid, a prominent Indonesian Muslim scholar gave 
his thought concerning the issue as well. He said that although the 
invasion was predicted before, it was still shocking. It meant that when a 
superpower country committed a unilateral act, the result would be 
injustice. Moreover, when this superpower country claimed getting a 
license to invade another country, it would be considered as an act of 
d . 38 amagmg. 
After all, many demonstrations against the U.S. invasion to Iraq 
led the MUI to issue a fatwa condemning the invasion. It shows us that 
people power was one of the key factors to determine or to support the 
MUI policies.39 
In the fa twa, the MUI considered that the U.S. and its allies' 
aggression to Iraq was committed without agreements and mandates 
from the U.N.; that Iraq was a sovereign country and one of the 
members of the U.N.; that the aggression was a human tragedy which 
caused thousand innocent civilians wounded; that the aggression 
destroyed the. world heritage, especially the Islamic civilization heritage 
and damaged houses of worship, public spheres, public schools, public 
housings, nature sources and others; that therefore, the MUI considered 
the necessity to draw up a fatwa about the legal status of the aggression 
to be a guidance for Muslims and people around the world. 40 
· In addition, the MUI recalled Quranic verses, especially Surat al 
Naml (27) verse 34 which reads: "She said: Lo! Kings, when they enter a 
township, ruin it and make the honour of its people shame. Thus will 
they do"; Surat al-Araf (7) verse 56: "Work not confusion in the earth 
after the fair ordering (thereof), and call on Him in fear and hope. Lo! 
The mercy of Allah is nigh unto the good"; Surat al-Taubah (9) verse 41 : 
"Go forth, light-armed and heavy-armed, and strive with your wealth 
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and your lives in the way of Allah! That is best for ye but kneW:'; Surat . 
al-B~qar~h (2) verse 90-193: "Fight in the way of Allah against thos~-~~o 
fight :against, you, but begin not hostilities. Lol Allah loveth: not 
aggressors. And slay them wherever ye find them, and dt:lve them out of 
the places whence they drove you . out, for . persecution is . worse than 
slaughter. And fight not with them at the Inviolable Place of Worship 
until they first attack you there; but if they attack you (there)then slay 
therh. Such is the reward ofdisbelievers. But ifthey desist, the lol Allah 
is Forgiving, Merciful. And fight them until persecution is no more,~ and 
religion is for Allah. But if they desist, then .let there be no hostility 
except against wrong-doers"; and Surat al~Hajj verse 39-40: '.'Sanction is 
given unto those who fight because they have been wronged; and Allah 
is indeed Able to give them victory. Those who. have. been driven from 
their homes unjustly only because they said: Our Lord is Allah~For had it 
not been for Allah's repelling some men ,by means of others; cloisters 
and churches and oratories. and mosques, wherein the name of Allah is 
oft mentioned, would assuredly have been pulled down. Verily Allah 
helpeth one who helpeth Him. Lo! Allah is Strong,·Almighty-".41 
Moreover, the MUI also recalled Hadiths. The first is from 
Bukhari and Muslim which reads: "Ibn Umar reported that: "founded a 
woman murdered in some parts of Rasulullah s.a.w's gazwah.;.:therefore 
Rasulullah s.a.w. forbade to kill women and children';. The second is also 
from Bukhari and Muslim: "Abdullah ibn Amr reported: "whoever killed 
defending theirwealth, therefore they died a martyr's death". 
In addition, the MUI paid attention to the taushiyah of Forum 
Ukhuwah Islamiyah of the MUI ·(the advice of Ukhuwah Islamiyah 
Forum) on 20 March 2003; the .. outlook of the Fatwa Commission 
Meeting of the MUI on 9 April 2003, 12 April2003, and 16 April 2003; 
opinions and demands from international society, especially Indonesians 
in · almost all of the provinces .· who· ·condemned and refused· the 
aggression; and after paying attentio'n to a letter • of the 1;fUI branch of · 
West Java concerning the solution of the aggression. . . , 
. After considering, recalling, and paying attention to !he issues 
above, the MUI establishedPatwa tentang Pn!Jerangan Amerika Serikat dan 
Sekulu'!Ja terhadap Irak (Fatwa about the Aggressi611. of the U.S~ and its 
allie~'to Iraq). The fatwa was established on 16 April2003 and signed by 
K.H. Ma 'ruf Amin as the chair of Fa twa Commission of the MUI and 
Drs. Hasanudin, M.Ag. as the secretary, of the commission. The fa twa 
consisted offive points. They were: 
1. The aggression of the u.s: and its allies to Iraq was an act of zhalim 
(despotic), unlawful, and against the Islanlic and international laws. 
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2. The brutally aggression causing death of women, children and old 
men, and the shattering of public facilities were acts of al-ifsad wal 
idhrar (annihilation and damaging), al-i'tida (overact), and a serious 
offence against human rights. 
3. The U.S. administration and its allies who were responsible for the 
aggression and the result of it must be prosecuted to the 
International Court of Justice to be punished as aggressors and 
war criminals. 
4. The U.S. government and its allies who were responsible for the 
. aggression must be responsible to rehabilitate the damages. 
5. The whole Iraq's territory before the aggression belonged to a 
sovereign country. Therefore, the establishment of a new 
government is the rights of the Iraqis.42 
To a large extent I argue that the fatwa was no more than a way 
to show the MUI' s legitimacy as the only religious national organization 
which holds the religious authority in Indonesia. The position of 
Indonesia as the largest Muslim country in the world was also legitimized 
by the MUI as one of the reasons to establish the fatwa . After the fall of 
the New Order Era, for some ulama, the MUI was considered as having 
more freedom to establish fatwas. 43 However, because of its activities in 
politics, the MUI seemed to have more interests to react to political 
situation than before. 
Other Fatwas 
In most Muslim countries, as many scholars and political analysts 
thought, voices against the invasion rose. The voices I would like to 
discuss here are fatwas issued by muftis. It is interesting to note that 
there were two kinds of fatwas issued by two different kinds of muftis. 
The first ones were fatwas issued by Sunni muftis and the second ones 
were those issued by Shiite muftis. By describing these fatwas below, I 
would also like to make a comparison between them and the fatwa 
issued by the MUI. 
Perhaps the earliest fatwa issued by Sunni muftis was the fatwa 
·of hundred muftis in Iraq. In the months before the invasion, December 
2002, Saddam Hussein gathered a group of 600 imams in Kirkuk and 
asked them to issue a fa twa calling on all .Muslims to join a jihad against 
the U.S. as a response of the possibility of the U.S. invasion to the 
country.44 After the invasion, many fatwas against the invasion were 
issued in some countries. Two of the fatwas were issued by Sheikh 
Ahmad Kutty, a senior lecturer and an Islamic scholar at the Islamic 
Institute of Toronto, Ontario, Canada and a group of muftis, consists of 
Dr. Ahmad Yusuf Sulaiman, Professor of Islamic Shari'ah at the Faculty 
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of Da!'Ulum; Cairo University; Dr. 'AbdeLFattah-Idrees, Professor of 
Comparatiye Jurisprudence at Al-Azhar University; and Dr.· Ahmad 
Abu~al~Wafa, Professor of International Law,· Faculty of Law at Cairo 
University. The first fa twa was issued on 24 March 200J in Live Fa twa 
of·IslamonLine.net. A certain person; named Jasper from Germany 
asked the question. Kutty stated that Muslims should support the Iraqi 
people, but they should riot do so while violating the laws ofthe lands 
'where. they live.45 The second fatwa was issued on 30July 2003 entitled 
''Should IraqisFight the Internaiional Forces in Iraq?".These muftis stated that 
scholars agree that it is an individual obligation to use all possible m_eans 
to defend the homeland against invasion. This means that not only men 
have to fight, but also excused people, such as women and the old, _must 
participate. In ~ddition, any external forces that go to Iraq to support the 
U.s; invasion inside Iraq are considered invaders.as well. Hence, they are 
to be treated in· the same manner as the U.S. forces; the invaded people 
must resist them by all possible means. However, Muslim forces must 
never participate in: fighting against Iraq. Nevertheless; if it happened 
that Muslims' took part, the popular resistance forces in Iraq should try 
their best to avoid fighting them: If they did not manage to avoid them, 
there would be no.·blame onthem.46 ' ' 
. ,
The first fatwa questioned by the German Jasper is: , 
"Is it allowed for Muslims all over. the world to support (with 
weapons) the resistance of the Iraqi people against the American 
aggression?"47 . . 
Sheikh Ahmad Kutty answered: . 
"Yes, Muslims should support the Iraqi people, but they should 
not do so while violatingthe laws of the larids where they live. 
There are so many other ways of supporting our brothers and 
· sisters in Iraq."48 . . . . 
· Kutty pointed at his another fa tWa entitled Backing Fellow Muslims 
in Iraq issued on 27 February 2005 at the request of'a certain 
Mary from Austria who asked: .. 
"How can Canadian, British, American, and European Muslims 
ba~k their oppressed fellow Muslims in Iraq?" 49 · 
He answered: ... . . . . · . 
"Not only Muslims who are supposed to back the. fellow 
oppressed Iraqis· as well as the humiliated peoples all over the 
world, but rather the whole humanity should play a positive role 
that is urged to step for\vard with the innate power to reject 
injustice, oppression, atrocities cominitted on every inch. of 
today's world. It is the innate conscience, the pulsating peaceful 
. heart whose calls go unheard. Here and there, there are millions 
' " . .. . . . ": . ~ . . 
ALQALAM 114 Vol. 26, No.1 Ganu~ri-Apri12009) 
of peace-loving peoples, Muslims and non-Muslims, who stage 
peaceful demonstrations, make themselves 'human shields' to 
prevent the military action of the aggressor who is careless to the 
untold human suffering in Iraq, Palestine, Kashmir, Afghanistan 
and many other countries. Thus, when we (Muslims and non-
Muslims) join hands together, when we say an emphatic "no" to 
the aggressor, when we clarify to what extent our religions 
condemn aggression and to what extent they criminalize human 
rights violations, then our demands, our calls and our efforts will 
reap fruits one day. Focusing more on the role of Muslims as far 
as the question in point is concerned, it's to be stressed that one 
of the main duties of Muslims is to support their Muslim 
brothers and sisters in all parts of the world, to provide them 
with the means to regenerate their strength, and support them 
until Allah grants them victory over the aggres sive enemy. An-
Nu 'man ibn Basheer (may Allah be pleased with him) quoted 
the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), as saying: "You 
see the believers as regards their being merciful among 
themselves, and showing love among themselves and being kind, 
resembling one body, so that, if any part of the body is not well 
then the whole body shares the sleeplessness (insomnia) and 
fever with it." (Reported by Al-Bukhari). 
For sure, Muslims can help ease the suffering of their fellow 
Muslims in Iraq through the payment of their zakah, charity, yields of 
their endowments, etc. Allah Almighty says, ( ... And whatsoever you 
spend (for good) He replaces it. And He is the Best of Providers. ) 
(Saba' 34: 39). Muslims outside the USA and Britain should boycott the 
products of those who launch attacks against Islam and Muslims. 5° This 
is the least that we can do so as to deter the enemy and help ease the 
dilemma Muslims are facing. Here are some of the things that we can 
realistically do: 
1. We must join hands and voices with those peace-loving 
citizens who oppose theoccupation. 
2. We must bring out the truth and facts about the situation 
through whatever media or means that are available to us. The 
media, in general, systematically distort and project a false 
image in order to sell falsehood. As Muslims, we must take the 
initiative to mobilize our resources in order to convey the truth 
objectively. 
3. We must come to the help of all those who are oppressed by 
providing all humanitarian aid that is possible. 
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4. We ~ust caine forward andparticip~te acti~elyin politics and 
m;ke sure ,to contact our elected representatives to stand for 
... : truth and justice. · · · · · · · · · . 
s.• 'Ui~tly, and not the least, we must sincerely pray to Allah 
Almighty to send down victory to the oppressed. We: should 
read q11lmt an-na~/ah, • which ·is a kind of special prayer 
.recommended in time . of calatri.ities arid tragedies .. Usually, 
qumit an~nazilah is done while standing straight after .bowing. 
As Muslims, .we must close our ranks and pray from our hearts 
for the brothers and sisters who are suffering most terribly; it is 
our duty to pray to'Allah to grant them viCtory arid relief. 
Qunut an-nazilah can. be recited ·both · individually and 
collectively~ While reciting it collectively; it is best that we 
choose to read it during Fajr; 'Isha' and Frida)' Prayers."51 
. . . . 
Someone with initial "J" questioned the second fatwa.52 H~/she 
asked: 
. ':"The U.S: is trying to convin~e the U.N. ~nd itsallied countries 
to. send international forces to Iraq. This is obviously due to the 
Americans' ··inability to face. the Iraqi popUlar :resistance force~ alone. 
What is the ruling on fighting ·the international forces that enter Iraq?" 53 
A group of mufti answered: · · 
,. "Scholars agree that it is an individual obligation to use· all 
possible means. to defend the homeland .against invasion/This means 
that not only men have to ·fight, but also excused people, such as 
women and the old, must participate·. In addition; any external forces 
that go to Iraq to support the U.S. invasion inside Iraq are considered 
invaders as well .. H~nce, they are to be treated iri the.same manner as the 
U.S.-led forces; the invaded people must resist them by all possible. 
means. However, Muslim forces inust never participate in ·fighting 
against ·Iraq. Butif it happened that· Muslims took part, the popular 
resistance forces in_ Iraq.· should try their best to avoid fighting them: If 
they did not maqage to avoid them, there woUld be no blame on them. 
Ans:wering your question, Dr. Ahmad Yusuf Sulaiman, -Professor of 
Islamic Shari'ah at the Faculty of Dar ~mum, Cairo University, states 
the following: "No one can de11y that fighting the invaders is ·an 
individual obligation, so that all people iri an invaded couritry, men, 
women, old people and even children, have to participate in resisting the 
invaders. If international forc~s are sent to Iraq. by U:N. resolution to 
maintain peace and security in .the country, without extending any 
support to the invaders, then the popular resistance forces in Iraq must 
not fight-them. If, on the other hand; they have.gone there to support 
-._~._,,___ " . . -~ ' .• ·-·- •' .. ' ; .. ~--:~-·-' .,. -' "- •,,·~.·-~·-\,·•-.•\ ,-.. -_.,,. 
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the, invaders and add legality to their occupation of the land, then· they 
are in the same position of the invaders and should be resisted by~,all 
a~ailable defence mechanisms. Muslim forces should never.·take part in· 
such invasion, and if they do, it would be a grave mistake. But the forces 
of popular. resistance must try their best. to avoid shooting the Muslim • 
forces~ ,However; if they could not manage anyway to avoid the Muslim. 
forces, .then there .is no blame on them. "Shedding more light on the 
issue, .the eminent Muslim scholar, Dr. 'Abdel-Fattah Idiees, Professor 
of Compar.ative Jurisprudence at Al-Azhar University, adds: ~'The. u.s . ..:·. 
led forces are no ~ore than invaders of the IraqLpeople. So :i:lie, Iraqis 
have to resist them. Allah Almighty says: . "Allah will not "giv'e' the · 
disbelievers any way (of success) against the believers." (An-Nisa': 141). 
Exegetes of the Qur'an explain this verse to mean that disbelie~ers must 
never,rule over the believers. So the Muslims are entitled· to resist 
invasior~ by all possible means to defend themselves and their lands.· 
This is one of the urgent cases of jihad in which fighting becomes an· ·.·.· · 
indiyidual obligation on all people in, the country, men, .women, old 
. peqple and children. It is principally impermissible forArab and Muslim 
. forces to participate in such invasion. But ifArab and Muslim are forces 
qent.by the U.N. for the sake of maintaining peace and secu'rityuntil a 
fair: government is established in Iraq, then the mission ofsuch Arab: 
and Muslim forces should not exceed peace maintenance. It is in this 
case only that Arab and Muslim forces may participate. Butthey are not 
permitted to use violence against the invaded people. OtherWise they. 
would be no more than invaders or supporters toinvasion and must be 
resisted. If any Arab or Muslim forces participated to maintain security 
of the invaders, then they are to be treated as invaders." Moreover, Dr. 
Ahmad Abu-Al-Wafa, Professor oflnternational Law, Faculty ofLaw at 
Cairo University, concludes: "The statUs quo in Iraqindicate's thatthe ·. 
,main purpose of sending international forces. to Iraq is to avoid daily , 
losses )n the U .S.-led forces there. Sending international forces to Iraq 
· has two possible interpretations: First; they are support to occupation.' 
In. other words, the international forces would be placed as ~hields for: • · 
'the U.S. and .the British forces in Iraq. In this case, it is permissible to 
'fight, them. Second, they are sent to evacuate U.S. and British· forces 
from Iraq and giving the reins of power there to the Iraqis themselves.·· .. 
In this case they are not to be fought: Rather, the way should be paved 
for, them to carry out the mission they are assigned with: 'But ifthey stay 
for ,a long time. with the presence of the U.S.-led forces in Iraq;then 
they must be fought and dismissed."54 , · 
Both fa twas supported Iraqis and other Muslims in the' world to· 
fight against theinvasion. They agreed that.it is an individual'obligati6n 
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to. use all possible ineans .. :to defend the hom~lan&' Fillthermore, any 
external forces that go to Iraq to 'support the U.s::invasion inside' Iraq 
were ,considered invaders as well: : · . · · . ; /1 
; . · Other voices from different parts of·the world indicate tha't 
fatwas-or fat\vas-like-·· against the· invasion were the main ·Islamic 
yoices .for calling on MuslimS'to take up a'nns against the U;S. forces in 
· Iraq .• For instance, on,21· March 2003,:Mohammed SayedTantawi, the 
Grand Sheikh ofAl-Azhar University in Cairo called for jihad, or .holy· 
war,.t6support the Iraqis. He issued afatwa against theinvasion. · 
'~Jihad in Islam is meant to defend religion; money,· soul, 
freedom, and to support those who are subject to injustice," 55 .. 
In addition, Sheikh Ahmed Bukhari, an influential Islamic voice 
in .India stated:. "The war between right arid wrong has begun~ this is 
·jihad." Moreover, Sheikh Hamza MansoUr, the leader of 'the Islamic 
Action Front, the largest mainstream Muslim party in Jordan, called on 
Muslims to defend Iraq against the U.S. invaders. He said: . · . 
"Under the U.S. occupation, no one will restrict their actions to 
peaceful means, and everyone will call for resistance by all the means 
they can muster."56 · 
. . . A number .of Shiite muftis issued fat\vas as well as those of 
Sunni .. The Gra~d AyatollahAl~sayyid MuhammedHussein'Fadlullah, a 
prominent ·Shiite imam· froin Lebanon, gave· the · same opinion 
concerning the issue; even though he. is a Shiite imam, for there is a 
general belief that Shiites always be 'the opponents of Sunnis in Iraq, in 
which Saddam Hussein involved in fighting $hiite.57 He thought that it 
was necessary to give· an absolute rejection to the invasion because he 
. knew that the .U.S. did not take up the invasion for the interest of the 
Iraqis but for the sake of its own strategic interests in the region. That is 
despite ·the fact that they rejected the Iraqi regime·as well which was an 
American regime. 58 . . ·. 
·.Furthermore, he had,issued·a· fatwa declaring the prohibition of 
helping the U.S. to. hold sw~y over the Iraqi people and he asked· the 
believers to face this in all possible means they have.59 However, he did 
not explicitly ask Muslims in Iraq and other countries to fight against the 
invasion; . Furthermore, when asked about his'· opinion concerning 
SaddamHussein; he stated:.·. · . · 
"I surely believe this man was a CIA agent and. that he 
implemented 'all: their plans in creating' distUrbance in the 'region; 
attacking :Iran, occupying Kuwait; confiscating the liberties of the Iraqi 
.. people, committing the brutal actions against the learned·. intellectuals 
presided by the martyr Ayatollah al-Sayyid Muhamtl1ad Baqir al-,Sadr and 
assassinating inany ofthe<Iraqi nobles including his party.:comrades. Ori · 
. • ' i . ~ - " . ~ . . " ' ... ' > • -
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finishing his task in serving its interests, America kicked him away. That 
is why we believe that Iraq has never seen such a tyrant."60 
His opinion about Saddam Hussein perhaps can explain why he 
issued a fatwa against the invasion, because he believed that both the 
U.S. and Saddam Hussein were the same objects they must fight. 
However, there were also different voices within Shiite 
community. In their desperate efforts to get the support of the Shiites, 
the U.S. focused on two Shiite leaders. The first one was Grand 
Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Sistani6\ based in Najaf, Iraq. As the only Grand 
Ayatollah of Iraq, he was considered the most senior leader of the Shiite 
community of Iraq. In September 2002, months before the invasion, 
Sistani issued a fatwa urging Muslims to stand united "and do their best 
to defend Iraq and protect it from the schemes of covetous 
aggress<;>rs."62 
. Nonetheless, after the U.S. troops had surrounded Najaf and 
when they found the local population fiercely resisting American capture 
of the town, the commanding officer of one of the two brigades of the 
101" Airborne Division met Sistani and managed to persuade him to 
issue another fatwa cancelling his earlier directive to oppose the 
invaders. On 3 April 2003, Sistani succumbed to the US pressure and 
issued another fatwa appealing to his followers not to obstruct the 
advance of the US forces or in other words he asked the Iraqis to keep 
silent and not resist the forces. 63 It may be seen that Iraqi nationalism 
became increasingly linked to fight for the regime as the invasion 
continued. The appeal for neutrality by Sistani would also have 
undermined the Shiite will to fight among those who felt they were 
fighting for their clan as much as they were fighting for Iraq. 
At the same time, the U.S persuaded Abdul Majid al-Khoei (or 
Abd al-Majid al-Khaw'i), the son of the late Grand Ayatollah Abul-
Qasim al-Khoei, who was Ayatollah Sistani's teacher, in order to rally the 
local Shiite population in support of the U.S. He issued a fatwa praising 
the U.S. troops for taking care, not to damage the Shiite holy shrines in 
Najaf. However, his fatwa had another impact. On 10 April 2003, the 
day after the fall of Baghdad, he and an aide were brutally stabbed to 
death in an incident at the Grand Imam Ali Mosque of Najaf. While the 
u.si projected the murder as due to internal rivalries amongst the leading 
·Shiite clergy of Najaf, the local inhabitants believed that the murder of 
al-Khoei was mainly due to the tendency that he was seen as an 
American stooge. In a statement, Mohammad Baqer Musawi al-Muhri; a 
pro-U.S. Shiite cleric based in Kuwait, blamed an organisation called the 
Jimaat-e-Sadr-Thani for the murder. Moqtada Sadr heads this 
organisation; the son of Mohammed Sadeq Sadr, a Shiite leader killed 
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-· alongwii:h his two other sons in 1999, allegedly by the'Iraqiintelligence 
agency. The tragic death of al-Khoei' is a reminder of. the pernicious 
·legacy SaddamHussein left: violence and politicised religiosity: His death 
tl?.arked the beginning of a schism in Najaf.64 ' 
The fa twas mentioned above-both issued by Sunni and Shiite 
muftis-have been Widely acknowledged by some Muslims. However, 
they also received different responses. The first ·two fatwas from 
-·IslamonLine.net affirmed the necessity of independent legal reasoning 
'(ijtihad) based on the Quran and Hadith and other:sources as well. The 
. site' aims to present a unified and lively Islam that keeps Muslims with 
·modern times in all areas; Their motto is "credibility" and "distinction". 
· They consist of several scholars, headed by a prominent alim, Dr. Yusuf 
· · Qardawi. Their role is to ensure that nothing on the· site violates the 
fixed principles of Islamic law (Shar'ia). Their generai policies in dude 
"addressing humanity; avoiding ties with or speaking for any country, 
party, group, council, ·or organization; -adopting the .middle ground ·of 
Islam; avoiding extremism or negligence;·· rejecting deViant or strange 
' opinions". IslamonLine is one of the _largest Muslim websites, to_ ensrire 
· that none of its content "violates the fixed principles of Islamic law". 
Under Qaradawi's supervision, IslamonLine frequendy attacks "western" 
values, especially the hedonism view, but also urges Muslims, especially 
· those living in the west, to work with non:-Muslims "in all laudable and 
beneficial pr~jects", for example, ·"to make oW: streets free of drugs, 
· alcoholism, prostitution and -. homosexualityi'.65 The fatwas of 
IslamonLine can be regarded as modern fa twas, based on two reasons: 
first, their legal reasoning uses the method of ijtihad and second, they are 
mainly about contemporary humanity issues· faced by humanity and they 
have been global issues as well. 
To a large extent I argue that two different fatwas from two 
: prominent Shiite leaders can be described· as unpopular fat\vas among 
Iraqis. As has been described above the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-
. Sistani; who issued a fa twa not to resist. the invasion, came in for 
criticism· from large factions of the Shiite community. The U.S. tried to 
meet the criticism by circulating reports that the Ayatollah's fatwa of 
September 2002 was not issued by him at all and thatit had been issued 
· by the Saddam' Hussein regime by forging his signature; The fact that 
this did not carry conviction since Sistani .had not denied until 3 April 
: 2003 his authorship of . the September 2002: fa tWa; Furthermore, the 
.:sadden treatment was addressed to Abdul Majid al-I<hoei. After issuing a 
'· ·fatwa praising the U.S. troops for not having damaged the Shiite holy 
shrines in Najaf, ori 10 April2003, the day after the fall.of Baghdad, al-
. · Khoei was killed just few yards from .the tomb of his ancestor.66 
,-<> ~~~~-----------~~~~~~---!"""!""""~~ 
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Therefore, I argue that the widely accepted fatwas by most Iraqis and 
Muslims all over the world were those that condemned the invasion and 
appealed for fighting against the Americans in Iraq. 
Conclusion 
The MUI as a national government organization which holds the 
highest religious authority in Indonesia established Fatwa tentang 
Petryerangan A merika Serikat dan Sekutunya terhadap Irak (a Fatwa about the 
Aggression of the U.S. and its allies to Ira g) on 16 April 2003. Prior to 
the issuance of the fatwa, a number of Indonesian scholars and ulama 
reacted against the invasion and it was also true that in other Muslim 
countries, some muftis, both those of Sunni and Shiite, issued fatwas, 
both similar and different compared to that of the MUI. 
The MUI fatwa was issued no longer than a month after the 
invasion. However, it was a little bit too late compared to the issuance of 
similar fatwas from other countries. It seems that the MUI as a national 
government organization reacted carefully regarding its position. I 
believe it was mainly because the MUI did "wait and see" towards other 
fatwas issued in other countries, especially those of the Middle East. 
Moreover, the Indonesians did not need a certain fatwa to condemn the 
invasion. The demonstrations against the invasion prior to the issuance 
of the fatwa show us that the Indonesians seemed to react fast after the 
invasion. It was the political parties, the Muslim organizations, the 
Muslim Youths and public figures who stood against the invasion. To 
some extent, I believe they paid ·attention to the Muslims solidarity and 
therefore they needed to react to the invasion. For many people, the 
MUI was not considered as the holder of the highest religious authority 
in Indonesia. 
Numerous demonstrations in Indonesia seem to be a justification 
for the MUI to issue a fatwa condemning the invasion. However, several 
scholars and ulama were among the first people to react against the 
invasion. They stood as public figures that were expected to react right 
after the invasion. Nonetheless, several political analysts thought that 
some politicians in order to keep their positions secure in the following 
gener;:tl election in 2004. 
The invasion-condemning fa twas were the majority of the fatwas 
·issued in some countries, especially in Iraq, IslamonLine, and other 
Middle East countries. The two opposite fatwas shown above were 
unpopular and one the muftis issuing them received an unpleasant 
treatment after his fatwa was issued. It seems for certain reasons, the 
resistant fatwas against the invasion were well accepted and had many 
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people· committed fighting against the U.S. or at least ·condemned. the 
invasion because ,of the fa twas. ·· · · 
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